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Supreme Court Unanimously Rules That Philadelphia 
Violated the Free Exercise Rights of Catholic Social 
Services by Conditioning Foster Care Contract on 
Providing Services to Married Same-Sex Couples
By Arthur S. Leonard
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously 
ruled in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 
2021 WL 245923, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 
3121 (June 17, 2021), that the City of 
Philadelphia violated the 1st Amendment 
Free Exercise of Religion by Catholic 
Social Services (CSS), a non-profit 
agency affiliated with the Archdiocese 
of Philadelphia, when the City ceased 
referring children in need of foster care 
to CSS and refused to renew the agency’s 
foster care contract because CSS 
refused on religious grounds to evaluate 
and certify married same-sex couples to 
be prospective foster parents. The Court 
found determinative that the city had 
no compelling justification to require 
CSS to abide by the non-discrimination 
provision in its contract with the City, 
when the contract reserved to the City 
sole discretion to allow exceptions to 
the non-discrimination policy, and 
there were at least twenty other foster 
care agencies in Philadelphia that were 
willing to evaluate and certify same-sex 
couples for foster placements.
Chief Justice John R. Roberts, Jr., 
wrote the opinion for the Court, which 
was joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, 
Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kegan, Brett 
Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett. 
Justice Samuel Alito filed an opinion 
concurring in the judgement, which was 
joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and 
Neil Gorsuch. Justices Alito and Thomas 
also joined an opinion concurring in the 
judgment by Justice Gorsuch. Justice 
Barrett filed a concurring opinion, 
joined in full by Justice Kavanaugh, and 
in part by Justice Breyer. Because Chief 
Justice Roberts’ opinion was joined 
by five of the justices, it is a “majority 
opinion” for the Court in terms of its 
analysis and holding. 
All nine justices agreed that the City’s 
failure to allow an exception was subject 
to “strict scrutiny,” and that the City had 
failed to provide compelling reasons for 
its actions that were sufficient to support 
the rulings by the 3rd Circuit and the 
district court, which had rejected CSS’s 
motion for preliminary injunctive relief. 
Six members of the Court got to this 
result by finding that its precedent of 
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872 (1990), did not apply to this 
case; three joined the judgment but not 
the Court’s opinion, finding that Smith 
should be overruled, and strict scrutiny 
applied under pre-Smith Free Exercise 
precedents.
Although the ultimate result – a 
ruling in favor of CSS – was not 
unexpected among Supreme Court 
watchers and commentators in light 
of both the oral arguments and the 
Court’s trend in favor of an expansive 
view of the Free Exercise Clause, it was 
notable and surprising to many that the 
six-member majority opinion spanned 
the ideological spectrum to include 
the Court’s remaining Democratic 
appointees, the conservative Chief 
Justice, and two of President Donald J. 
Trump’s conservative appointees, and 
that the three justices who were eager 
to use this case as a vehicle to overrule 
the Court’s three decades’ precedent of 
Smith, were unable to secure the votes 
of Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett, 
who are both strong advocates of free 
exercise of religion. 
Under Smith, government laws or 
actions that are neutral with respect to 
religion and have general applicability 
are, assuming they serve a rational 
purpose, generally immune from 
attack under the Free Exercise Clause. 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion for the 
Court in Smith reversed four decades 
of Free Exercise precedents, under 
which laws incidentally burdening free 
exercise of religion were subjected to 
strict scrutiny. Four justices concurred 
in the judgment in Smith but wrote 
separately to disavow the Court’s 
overruling of existing Free Exercise 
precedents. Congress sought to overrule 
the decision with its first enactment of 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA). When the Court subsequently 
ruled that Congress was without power 
to override its constitutional rulings, 
Congress passed a narrower version of 
RFRA under which individuals could 
raise a free exercise defense to attempts 
by the federal government to enforce 
general federal laws that incidentally 
burdened their religious practices, 
putting the government to the burden 
of showing a compelling justification 
for the challenged law. Many states 
passed similar laws, and the Court itself 
subsequently ruled that laws otherwise 
sheltered under Smith could be attacked 
under the Free Exercise Clause where 
the religious objectors showed that 
the challenged law had been passed 
specifically to impair religious freedom. 
Chief Justice Roberts assembled his 
majority of six justices by finding a 
way to rule for CSS without overruling 
Smith. In order to get there, he found 
that the City’s Fair Practices Ordinance 
(FPO) did not apply to this case – thus 
eliminating a legal authority that would 
fall within the range of Smith’s “neutral 
laws of general applicability” – and that 
the action being challenged at this point 
by CSS – the City’s insistence that CSS 
had to agree not to discriminate against 
same-sex couples – reduced the question 
at issue to why the City’s Commissioner 
of Human Services did not exercise the 
sole discretion reserved to her under the 
City’s form contract to grant an exception 
to CSS from complying with the non-
discrimination requirement. Because 
of the discretionary exception clause 
in the contract, Roberts concluded, the 
case did not involve a rule of “general 
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applicability,” thus rendering Smith 
irrelevant and subjecting the City’s 
action to the “strictest scrutiny,” as 
described in dicta in the Smith opinion 
for challenged laws that either were not 
neutral with respect to religion or were 
not of general applicability.
In recounting the history of this 
case, Chief Justice Roberts reported 
that the Catholic Church in Philadelphia 
has been providing services to “needy 
children” since 1798, when a yellow 
fever epidemic prompted a priest to start 
an organization to “care for orphans” 
whose parents were felled by the 
disease. During the 19th century, “nuns 
ran asylums for orphaned and destitute 
youth.” During the 20th century, the 
Church established a Children’s Bureau 
to “place children in foster homes.” CSS, 
licensed as a foster-care agency by the 
State of Pennsylvania, has had a series of 
contracts with the City dating back half a 
century to evaluate and certify adults as 
qualified, under standards prescribed by 
a state statute, to be foster parents. The 
City compensates CSS for performing 
this service. When the Department of 
Human Services has a child in need 
of foster placement, it sends a request 
to the various agencies with which it 
contracts, the agencies then “report 
whether any of their certified families 
are available,” and the Department then 
“places the child with what it regards as 
the most suitable family.” The agency 
then provides supportive services 
during the foster placement. The City’s 
compensation to the agency is a major 
source of revenue for CSS.
As a Catholic agency, CSS has 
long had a policy of placing children 
with single foster parents or married 
couples, but not with unmarried couples 
regardless of whether they are same-
sex or different-sex. CSS maintains 
that because Catholic doctrine does 
not recognize marriages of same-
sex couples, same-sex couples are 
not qualified to be certified as foster 
parents even though now they can 
legally marry under state law. And, of 
course, Catholic doctrine disapproves 
unmarried cohabitation. According to 
CSS’s allegations in this case, “no same-
sex couple has ever sought certification 
from CSS,” and if CSS is approached 
by a same-sex couple, CSS would refer 
them to a nearby agency that would 
provide those services that CSS could 
not provide consistent with Catholic 
Church doctrine. There are at least 
twenty such agencies in the Philadelphia 
metropolitan area. CSS is presently the 
only such agency that refuses to evaluate 
and certify same-sex couples.
This became an issue after the 
Supreme Court ruled in 2015 in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584 (2015), that same-sex couples 
have a right to marry under the 14th 
Amendment’s Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses. After Obergefell, 
controversies arose around the country 
when Catholic and some Protestant 
adoption and foster care agencies 
indicated they would not provide their 
services to married same-sex couples 
and encountered opposition from state 
and local governments that maintained 
non-discrimination policies covering 
sexual orientation. Reporters for the 
Philadelphia Inquirer investigating the 
issue locally determined that only two 
agencies in the city, CSS and Bethany 
Christian Services, would not evaluate 
and certify same-sex couples. After 
the newspaper reported this finding 
in 2018, the Philadelphia City Council 
passed a resolution calling on the City’s 
civil rights agency to investigate, and 
the Department of Human Services 
contacted Bethany and CSS seeking 
a resolution to the issue. Bethany 
capitulated to the City’s pressure, but 
CSS stood firm, upon which DHS 
stopped referring children to CSS for 
foster placement and allowed its annual 
contract with the agency to lapse.
This lawsuit was begun by some 
individuals who were foster parents 
through CSS and the Archdiocese of 
Philadelphia, represented by Alliance 
Defending Freedom (which we have 
sometimes referred to as “Alliance 
Defending Freedom to Discriminate 
Against LGBTQ People,” since that 
appears to be one of the central missions 
of the organization). They filed suit in 
the U.S. District Court of the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, alleging that 
the City’s action violated both the Free 
Exercise and Free Speech Clauses 
of the 1st Amendment, and seeking 
preliminary injunctive relief to require 
the City to resume referring children 
and compensating CSS for evaluating 
and certifying prospective foster 
parents while the case was pending. 
Among other things, CSS argued that 
it was not a “public accommodation” 
within the meaning of the City’s Fair 
Practices Ordinance (which bans 
sexual orientation discrimination 
expressly), and that the City’s action 
was subject to strict scrutiny under the 
1st Amendment, so CSS was likely to 
prevail on the merits as required to get 
preliminary relief. (Pennsylvania’s state 
anti-discrimination law does not include 
“sexual orientation” as a prohibited 
ground of discrimination, and this 
case arose years before the Supreme 
Court’s Bostock ruling of 2020, after 
which many state agencies and courts 
have found that their sex discrimination 
laws will now cover sexual orientation 
claims.)
The District Court found that the 
Ordinance did cover this situation, and 
that as the Ordinance was a neutral 
law of general applicability under 
Smith, CSS was unlikely to prevail on 
its constitutional claim and was thus 
not entitled to preliminary injunctive 
relief. CSS appealed this ruling to the 
3rd Circuit, which affirmed the District 
Court as to both issues – coverage under 
the City statute and applicability of 
Smith. In its cert petition, in addition to 
asking the Supreme Court to reverse on 
the two 1st Amendment theories, CSS 
asked the Court to “revisit” its decision 
in Smith, as several of the justices had 
indicated in past cases that the Court 
should do. The Court granted cert on all 
three questions: free exercise of religion, 
freedom of speech, and whether Smith 
should be “revisited (a euphemism for 
“overruled”). 
If Smith remains valid as a precedent 
and is applicable to this case, the denial 
of preliminary relief by the district court 
would be correct, if one assumes that 
the City’s reliance on the FPO brought 
this case within the sphere of a “neutral 
rule of general applicability.” However, 
overruling Smith in this case would be 
quite problematic, as Justice Barrett 
pointed out in her concurring opinion, 
raising a host of questions and likely 
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stimulating a barrage of litigation to 
settle those questions. The way to avoid 
this problem, as Roberts explained, 
was to find that Smith does not apply 
to this case, which the Court could 
do by narrowing down the question 
presented through its interpretation of 
the City ordinance and the language of 
the standard contract the City used to 
contract with foster care agencies.
In Smith, Roberts explained, the 
Court said that a “law is not generally 
applicable if it ‘invite[s]’ the government 
to consider the particular reasons 
for a person’s conduct by providing 
‘a mechanism for individualized 
exemptions.’” In addition, he wrote, a 
“law also lacks general applicability 
if it prohibits religious conduct while 
permitting secular conduct that 
undermines the government’s asserted 
interests in a similar way.” Thus, if an 
ordinance does not embody an across-
the-board rule without exceptions 
or exemptions, it does not constitute 
a “generally applicable” rule. As to 
the FPO, the solution was to find that 
CSS, as it has consistently argued 
throughout the litigation, is not a “public 
accommodation.” CSS also argued 
that “the ordinance cannot qualify 
as generally applicable because the 
City allows exceptions to it for secular 
reasons despite denying one for CSS’s 
religious exercise. But that constitutional 
issue arises only if the ordinance applies 
to CSS in the first place,” wrote Roberts. 
“We conclude that it does not because 
foster care agencies do not act as 
public accommodations in performing 
certifications.” 
He reached this result by a close 
reading of the definition of a public 
accommodation in the ordinance. A 
public accommodation is an entity 
“which solicits or accepts the patronage 
or trade of the public or whose 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages or accommodations are 
extended, offered, sold, or otherwise 
made available to the public.” Roberts 
insisted, “Certification is not ‘made 
available to the public’ in the usual sense 
of the words.” Turning to the concrete 
examples of covered businesses in 
the similar Pennsylvania state anti-
discrimination law – hotels, restaurants, 
drug stores, swimming pools, 
barbershops and public conveyances 
– he wrote that “the ‘common theme’ 
is that a public accommodation must 
‘provide a benefit to the general public 
allowing individual members of the 
general public to avail themselves of 
that benefit if they so desire,” citing a 
Pennsylvania intermediate appellate 
decision construing the state law, 
Blizzard v. Floyd, 149 Pa. Commw. 
503, 506, 613 A.2d 619, 621 (1992). 
(Why the state law should be deemed 
relevant, when it did not forbid sexual 
orientation discrimination at the time 
the case arose, is not explained by 
Roberts, as Justice Gorsuch notes in 
his concurring opinion.) But, Roberts 
wrote, “Certification as a foster parent, 
by contrast, is not readily accessible 
to the public,” since it requires a 
“customized and selective assessment 
that bears little resemblance to staying 
in a hotel, eating at a restaurant, or riding 
a bus.” After describing the evaluation 
process in detail, he wrote, “All of 
this confirms that the one-size-fits-all 
public accommodations model is a poor 
match for the foster care system.” He 
asserted that the district court had not 
taken account of “the uniquely selective 
nature of the certification process” in 
reaching its conclusion, agreeing with 
CSS’s position that the ordinance does 
not apply to this function. And, he 
found, it was therefore not necessary 
to examine CSS’s alternative argument 
that the ordinance did not establish a 
generally applicable rule since the City 
did allow exceptions to its requirements 
for various secular reasons.
Of more immediate moment, 
however, was how Roberts chose to 
characterize the question before the 
Court once the ordinance was deemed 
inapplicable. Now the focus was on 
the contractual anti-discrimination 
clause that the City insisted CSS must 
sign if the City was to resume referring 
children and honoring (and paying for) 
CSS’s certifications of foster parents 
and families. Section 3.21 of the 
contract, titled Rejection of Referral, 
states: “Provider shall not reject a child 
or family including, but not limited to, . 
. . prospective foster or adoptive parents, 
for Services based upon . . . their sexual 
orientation . . . unless an exception 
is granted by the Commissioner or 
the Commissioner’s designee, in his/
her sole discretion.” This, found the 
Court, “incorporates a system of 
individual exemptions, made available 
in this case at the ‘sole discretion’ of the 
Commissioner. The City has made clear 
that the Commissioner ‘has no intention 
of granting an exception’ to CSS.” 
But, since a system of discretionary 
exceptions means, as described in 
Smith, that this is not a rule of “general 
applicability,” Smith does not apply 
to the question whether the City’s 
refusal to grant an exception violates 
CSS’s right to free exercise of religion 
in conducting its mission. CSS did 
allege in its complaint that the City has 
allowed departures from the categorical 
anti-discrimination provision by 
allowing agencies, for example, to 
take account of factors such as race 
in suggesting qualifications for foster 
families for particular children, but 
Roberts asserted that it did not matter 
whether the City had ever allowed an 
exception, so long as it had reserved 
the right to do so in its contract with 
CSS. And, the Court deemed irrelevant 
a general non-discrimination provision 
elsewhere in the contract which did not 
have discretionary exception language, 
holding that the more specific non-
discrimination provision concerning 
placement of foster children with its 
discretionary exception language took 
priority. 
The City attempted to argue that it 
was entitled to a relatively free hand 
when “setting rules for contractors 
when regulating the general public,” 
and that individuals “accept certain 
restrictions on their freedom as part of 
the deal” when they contract to perform 
a function on behalf of the government. 
The Court was not buying this argument, 
noting that the City’s brief in this case 
“rightly acknowledges, ‘principles of 
neutrality and general applicability 
still constrain the government in its 
capacity as manager.’” And, Roberts 
observed, “We have never suggested 
that the government may discriminate 
against religion when acting in its 
managerial role. And Smith itself drew 
support from cases involving internal 
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government affairs . . . No matter the 
level of deference we extend to the 
City, the inclusion of a formal system 
of entirely discretionary exceptions in 
section 3.21 renders the contractual 
non-discrimination requirement not 
generally applicable.” The Court also 
rejected the City’s argument that a more 
general anti-discrimination provision 
elsewhere in the contract, which does 
not have the exception language, is the 
only relevant provision, finding that 
the language of Section 3.21 sweeps 
“more broadly” than the limited scope 
suggested by its title, “Rejection of 
Referral,” as it expressly applies to 
rejection of “prospective foster parents.” 
Having found that Smith doesn’t 
apply to this case, the Court turned to 
its traditional Free Exercise analysis, 
finding that the City’s action must be 
examined “under the strictest scrutiny 
regardless of Smith,” and that there was 
no need to consider whether to modify 
or overrule Smith as a result, thus 
dashing the hopes of Alito, Gorsuch and 
Thomas, as expressed in the concurring 
opinions by Alito and Gorsuch.
The City put forth three “compelling 
interests” that it claimed were served 
by the non-discrimination provision: 
“maximizing the number of foster 
parents, protecting the City from 
liability, and ensuring equal treatment 
of prospective foster parents and foster 
children.” Roberts criticizes these 
as being stated at too high a level of 
generality for a strict scrutiny analysis, 
stating that the question “is not whether 
the city has a compelling interest 
in enforcing its non-discrimination 
policies generally, but whether it 
has such an interest in denying an 
exemption to CSS,” and that “once 
properly narrowed, the City’s asserted 
interests are insufficient.” He argued 
that including CSS in the foster care 
program “seems likely to increase, 
not reduce, the number of available 
foster parents,” and that it was only 
“speculation” that the City “might be 
sued over CSS’s certification practices.” 
“That leaves the interest of the City 
in the equal treatment of prospective 
foster parents and foster children,” 
wrote Roberts. “We do not doubt that 
this interest is a weighty one, for ‘our 
society has come to the recognition that 
gay persons and gay couples cannot be 
treated as social outcasts or as inferior 
in dignity and worth,’” quoting from 
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion for 
the Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop 
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). “On the facts of 
this case, however, this interest cannot 
justify denying CSS an exception for 
its religious exercise,” he wrote. “The 
creation of a system of exceptions under 
the contract undermines the City’s 
contention that its non-discrimination 
policies can brook no departures. The 
City offers no compelling reason why 
it has a particular interest in denying an 
exception to CSS while making them 
available to others.”
Left unspoken in the opinion but 
discussed during the oral argument and 
alluded to in concurring opinions, was 
the fact that there are numerous other 
foster care agencies in Philadelphia 
that would readily provide the service 
of evaluating and certifying same-
sex couples to be foster parents. That 
could undermine the argument that 
the City has a compelling reason not 
to grant an exception to CSS, other 
than the City’s more general objection 
to spending taxpayer money to pay 
for a service that is discriminatorily 
denied to some of its citizens because 
of their sexual orientation. As to that, 
there is the continuing question, never 
mentioned by the Court, of whether 
expending taxpayer funds in support 
of a religious organization that relies 
on religious doctrine to discriminate 
against members of the public offends 
the Establishment Clause. The Supreme 
Court majority as currently constituted 
has slight regard for the Establishment 
Clause, the originalists among them no 
doubt construing it to have the limited 
meaning that states may not have 
established churches directly supported 
out of public revenues, because that is 
arguably what people thought it meant 
in 1791, having been liberated through 
independence from the established 
Church of England. At the time of 
independence, there were established 
churches in some of the states, and 
because the Bill of Rights as adopted 
in 1791 was binding only on the federal 
government, some states continued for a 
time to have established churches. The 
fear that the 1st Amendment addressed, 
it can be argued, was that Congress 
would attempt to establish a church 
for the nation that would be funded by 
the federal government and that would 
supplant the established state churches 
under the Supremacy Clause.
“CSS seeks only an accommodation 
that will allow it to continue serving the 
children of Philadelphia in a manner 
consistent with its religious beliefs,” 
concluded Roberts; “it does not seek 
to impose those beliefs on anyone else. 
The refusal of Philadelphia to contract 
with CSS for the provision of foster care 
services unless it agrees to certify same-
sex couples as foster parents cannot 
survive strict scrutiny and violates the 
First Amendment.”
Because the Court had resolved the 
appeal in favor of CSS under the Free 
Exercise clause, he wrote, “we need not 
consider whether they also violate the 
Free Speech Clause.” The Court reversed 
the 3rd Circuit’s decision affirming the 
district court’s denial of preliminary 
injunctive relief and remanded the case 
“for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.” What that means is not 
elucidated further. Since this case came 
up to the Court without a record on the 
merits as an interlocutory appeal from 
a denial of a preliminary injunction, 
there needs to be further litigation to 
determine the relevant facts, unless 
the City decides to settle the case by 
resuming its contractual relationship 
with CSS without insisting that it 
comply with the non-discrimination 
policy, presumably by the Commissioner 
exercising discretion to make an 
exception for CSS. One anticipates that 
then it would also be approached by 
Bethany Social Services for permission 
to resume that agencies policy regarding 
same-sex couples, and perhaps as well 
by other agencies seeking similar 
permission. Of course, as Alito and 
Gorsuch suggest in their concurrences, 
the City might just revise its contract 
to remove the discretionary exception 
language, or amend the FPO to expressly 
bring social service agencies within the 
definition of public accommodations, to 
bring the case back within the ambit of 
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Smith. That would presumably support 
the City’s refusal to contract with CSS 
under the Smith precedent, and the case 
would make its way up the appellate 
ladder once again, giving the Court a 
new vehicle to “revisit” Smith if four 
justices were persuaded to do so.
Justice Barrett’s brief concurrence 
devotes its first paragraph to casting 
doubt on the validity of Smith, but then 
poses the question of what would “replace 
Smith” in the Court’s jurisprudence, 
posing a series of questions about how 
to apply the Free Exercise Clause in 
Smith’s absence. She was concerned, 
for example, with whether a one-size-
fits-all strict scrutiny approach would be 
appropriate, regardless of the severity of 
the burden imposed on free exercise in 
a particular case. “We need not wrestle 
with these questions in this case,” she 
wrote, “because the same standard 
applies regardless of whether Smith stays 
or goes.” Accepting Roberts’ conclusion 
that the discretionary exception feature 
of the contract takes this case outside 
the general applicability standard of 
Smith, she noted, this becomes a strict 
scrutiny case, so there is no need in 
this case to reconsider Smith. Justice 
Kavanaugh concurred with all of this, 
while Justice Breyer did not join the first 
paragraph casting doubt on Smith, while 
joining the rest.
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion 
was 15 pages long. Justice Alito’s 
concurrence ran on for 77 pages, 
excoriating Smith, pointing out the 
problems of line-drawing it creates and 
hypothesizing numerous cases where 
Smith would shield the government 
from challenges to potentially severe 
burdens imposed on individual religious 
freedom. Alito’s lengthy opinion, which 
delves deep into the history leading to 
the adoption of the Free Exercise Clause 
and the jurisprudence developed under 
it leading eventually to Smith, reads 
as if it was drafted to be a majority 
opinion justifying overruling Smith. 
But Alito could not recruit a majority 
to go along, and he was contemptuous 
of the opinion endorsed by the majority 
evading the question. One suspects that 
few other than ardent Free Exercise 
proponents will struggle through Alito’s 
extended discourse, although it will 
provide fodder for litigants in future 
cases seeking to persuade the Court to 
overrule Smith.
“This decision might as well be 
written on the dissolving paper sold in 
magic shops,” Alito wrote of Roberts’ 
opinion, pointing out that by rewriting its 
contract to eliminate the discretionary 
exception feature, Philadelphia could 
bring the case back within the ambit 
of Smith. “If it does that, then, voila, 
today’s decision will vanish – and the 
parties will be back where they started,” 
litigating this all over again. “The City 
will claim that it is protected by Smith; 
CSS will argue that Smith should be 
overruled; the lower courts, bound by 
Smith, will reject that argument; and 
CSS will file a new petition in this 
Court challenging Smith. What is the 
point of going around in this circle?” he 
asked. “After receiving more than 2,500 
pages of briefing and after more than a 
half-year of post-argument cogitation, 
the Court has emitted a wisp of a 
decision that leaves religious liberty in 
a confused and vulnerable state. Those 
who count on this Court to stand up for 
the First Amendment have every right to 
be disappointed – as am I.”
By contrast, in a little more than 
ten pages Justice Gorsuch eviscerated 
the Court’s explanation of how this 
case was not subject to the precedent 
of Smith, contending that Roberts’ 
method of dealing with the FPO was 
inappropriate, probably wrong, and 
something the Court should not have 
been doing, since the court ordinarily 
defers to district courts’ interpretations 
of state and local laws. Furthermore, 
he disparages how Roberts reconciles 
the two antidiscrimination provisions 
in the contract, asking why the Court 
is engaging in the common law task of 
contract interpretation, and he points 
out that the extended analysis in which 
Roberts engaged was not argued in 
the parties’ briefs or in the hearing, 
but seems to have been invented by 
the majority solely for the purpose of 
escaping Smith and thus not having to 
confront the precedent head-on. “Given 
all the maneuvering,” he wrote, “it’s 
hard not to wonder if the majority is so 
anxious to say nothing about Smith’s 
fate that it is willing to say pretty much 
anything about municipal law and the 
parties’ briefs. One way or another, the 
majority seems determined to declare 
there is no ‘need’ or ‘reason’ to revisit 
Smith today. But tell that to CSS. Its 
litigation has already lasted years – and 
today’s (ir)resolution promises more 
of the same. Had we followed the path 
Justice Alito outlines – holding the 
City’s rules cannot avoid strict scrutiny 
even if they qualify as neutral and 
generally applicable – this case would 
end today. Instead, the majority’s course 
guarantees that this litigation is only 
getting started. As the final arbiter of state 
law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
can effectively overrule the majority’s 
reading of the Commonwealth’s public 
accommodations law. The City can 
revise its FPO to make even plainer 
still that its law does encompass foster 
services. Or with a flick of a pen, 
municipal lawyers can rewrite the City’s 
contract to close the Sec. 3.21 loophole. 
Once any of that happens, CSS will find 
itself back where it started.”
Gorsuch concludes enumerating the 
many costs to the system, the parties, 
and society in general in not resolving 
the problem of Smith in this case. “Smith 
committed a constitutional error,” he 
wrote. “Only we can fix it. Dodging the 
question today guarantees it will recur 
tomorrow. These cases will keep coming 
until the Court musters the fortitude 
to supply an answer. Respectfully, it 
should have done so today.” 
The Court’s action in this case 
immediately brings to mind its action in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop. In both cases, 
the Court sought to avoid having to 
decide whether to abandon the principle 
of Smith and to open up any government 
action or policy that incidentally 
burdens somebody’s free exercise of 
religion to strict scrutiny attack under 
the 1st Amendment. In both cases, the 
Court found an “off-ramp” by which 
it could rule in favor of the Petitioner 
without having to overrule Smith. In 
so doing, the Court sent mixed signals 
to the lower federal courts and the bar, 
reinforcing the general view that the 
Court will strain to find a way to rule 
in favor of individual Free Exercise 
petitioners without formally abandoning 
Smith and doing what Congress sought 
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to achieve with its first iteration of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: 
return Free Exercise law to where it was 
before Smith was decided. 
The Court had another opportunity 
to address the question next term, in 
Arlene’s Flowers v. State of Washington, 
No. 19-333 (petition filed 9/11/2019). 
The day after the Court announced its 
decision in Fulton, Alliance Defending 
Freedom filed a Supplement to its cert 
petition (which had not been listed for 
discussion at the Court’s conferences 
in more than a year, according to the 
Court’s docket listings), renewing its 
call for a grant of cert and quoting 
from the concurring opinions in Fulton. 
The Supplement asserted a 4-2 split in 
lower federal and state courts about 
how to deal with the clash between 
anti-discrimination laws and First 
Amendment freedom of expression 
or religious exercise claims, as well 
as a split over whether the “hostility 
to religion” holding in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop applies only to adjudicatory 
bodies, or as well the to elected officials 
and prosecutors in making decisions 
whether to proceed on discrimination 
claims. But the Court did not take the 
bait, announcing on July 2 that it was 
denying the petition, with only Alito, 
Thomas and Gorsuch indicating they 
would have granted it (no surprise 
there). 
Alliance Defending Freedom 
represented the Petitioners in Fulton, 
with Lori H. Windham arguing at 
the telephonic hearing. The Trump 
Administration argued in support of 
CSS as an amicus, with Hashim M. 
Mooppan appearing from the Solicitor 
General’s Office. Neal K. Katyal and 
Jeffrey L. Fisher argued for Respondents, 
Fisher for the City of Philadelphia and 
Katyal for the Intervenor organizations 
– Support Center for Child Advocates 
and Philadelphia Family Pride – who 
defended the City’s action to terminate 
CSS’s participation in the foster care 
system in the district and circuit courts. 
The ACLU was also listed as a counsel 
of record for the Intervenors. ■
Arthur S. Leonard is the Robert F. 
Wagner Prof. of Labor and Employment 
Law at New York Law School.
President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., 
issued an Executive Order on January 
20, 2020 (Inauguration Day), directing 
that Executive Branch agencies should 
apply the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 140 
S. Ct. 1731 (2020), to interpret statutes 
forbidding discrimination because of 
sex to cover claims of discrimination 
because of sexual orientation or 
gender identity “so long as the laws 
do not contain sufficient indications 
to the contrary.” The EO specifically 
referenced Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 as one such law. 
The president followed up with an EO 
on March 8 specifically concerning 
equality in education, again referencing 
Title IX, and a March 26 Memorandum 
issued by the Civil Rights Division of 
the Department of Justice reiterated its 
view that Title IX should be interpreted 
to ban discrimination based on sexual 
orientation or gender identity.
The Office of Civil Rights of the 
U.S. Department of Education (OCR) 
announced on June 16 that it was 
sending a “Notice of Interpretation” 
to the Federal Register for publication 
formally confirming that Title IX, 
which prohibits educational institutions 
that receive federal funding from 
discriminating against students “on the 
basis of sex,” applies to discrimination 
because of sexual orientation or gender 
identity (transgender status).
This announcement came just a 
year and a day after the Supreme 
Court interpreted Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits 
employment discrimination “because of 
sex,” to include discrimination because 
of sexual orientation or transgender 
status, in Bostock. In that case, the 
Court combined appeals from the 
2nd, 6th and 11th Circuit Courts of 
Appeals involving two gay men and a 
transgender woman alleging wrongful 
discharge under Title VII and voted 
6-3 that any discrimination against an 
employee because they are gay, lesbian 
or transgender is necessarily at least 
in part because of their sex and thus 
covered by the statute. President Donald 
J. Trump’s first appointee to the Court, 
Justice Neil Gorsuch, wrote the opinion 
by assignment from Chief Justice John 
Roberts, who joined the opinion together 
with Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Sonia 
Sotomayor. Justice Gorsuch premised 
his ruling on a textual interpretation of 
the language of Title VII, focusing on 
the ordinary meaning that would attach 
to the words and phrases of the statute 
when it was enacted in 1964, and found 
that the result was “clear.”
Although the Bostock decision 
directly interpreted only Title VII, its 
reasoning clearly applied to any law 
that prohibits discrimination “because 
of sex” or “on the basis of sex,” as 
the Education Department’s Acting 
Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, 
Suzanne B. Goldberg, explained in the 
Notice issued on June 16.
“After reviewing the text of Title IX 
and Federal courts’ interpretation of Title 
IX,” wrote Goldberg, “the Department 
has concluded that the same clarity [that 
the Supreme Court found under Title 
VII] exists for Title IX. That is, Title IX 
prohibits recipients of Federal financial 
assistance from discrimination based on 
sexual orientation and gender identity in 
their education programs and activities. 
The Department has also concluded for 
the reasons described in this Notice that, 
to the extent other interpretations may 
exist, this is the best interpretation of the 
statute.”
The Notice listed “numerous” lower 
federal court decisions that were issued 
over the past year taking this position, 
including the most recent ruling by the 
4th Circuit Court of Appeals in Grimm 
v. Gloucester County School Board, 
972 F. 3d 586 (4th Cir. 2020), rehearing 
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